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DOUGLAS L. GRANT*
Limiting Liability for Long-Continued
Breach of Interstate Water Allocation
Compacts
ABSTRACT
Recent Supreme Court decisions in Texas v. New Mexico and
Kansas v. Colorado, involving assessment of damages for long-
term breaches of interstate water compacts, have raised the
specter of huge liability for breaching states. Thus far the
Supreme Court has not dealt with the possibility that time may
bar some claims of long-continued breach. The ancient principle
of nullum tempus-no time runs against the sovereign-might
enable a sovereign plaintiff state to recover damages no matter
how old. The nullum tempus principle should not apply in
water compact enforcement suits, however, because it would
produce little or no public benefit in that situation and because its
application would violate the constitutional plan of equal footing
for litigating states. With the removal of the principle of nullum
tempus, the defenses of either laches or a borrowed statute of
limitations may reduce a defendant state's liability for breach of
an interstate water compact.
INTRODUCTION
Interstate compacts are the major means of defining the rights of
states to divert and use the flow of rivers that cross or form their borders.
Various combinations of states have negotiated 26 water allocation
compacts.' In contrast, Congress has legislated interstate allocations only
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1. See Douglas L. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in 4 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1991 ed. 1996 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2002)
[hereinafter Water Compacts]. Twenty-two of the compacts are solely between states; the
other four include the United States as a signatory party in addition to the states. Id.
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twice,2 and the Supreme Court has decreed interstate allocations for only
three rivers.
Historically, states realized that they could not attract federal
funding and private capital needed for water development projects on
interstate rivers if their shares of the flows were uncertain.4 They
negotiated water allocation compacts in an effort to provide desired
certainty.5 They were optimistic that compacting would promote
certainty not only by defining individual state shares but by
"eliminat[ing] all future litigation of the matters treated."6
Compacting avoided litigation for a time. Most water allocation
compacts are more than four decades old 7 and some of them go back to
the 1920s." The first suit between states to interpret and enforce a water
allocation compact was not brought until 1974.9 Since then, however,
three more such suits have been filed. 10 These are unlikely to be the last
ones. The 1974 suit arose because compact negotiators relied on data and
assumptions that later proved erroneous, and the compacting states
could not agree on how the new information should affect their rights
and duties." At least one more water allocation compact is based on data
and assumptions now known to be erroneous,12 and litigation-producing
2. Douglas L. Grant, Apportionment by Congress, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
47.01(b) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 1996 Repl. Vol.).
3. Douglas L. Grant, Equitable Apportionment Suits Between States, in 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 45.07(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 1996 Repl. Vol.) [hereinafter
Apportionment Suits].
4. See M.C. Hinderlider & R.I. Meeker, Interstate Water Problems and Their Solutions, 90
TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. SOC'Y CWv. ENG'RS 1035, 1038 (1927) [hereinafter Interstate Water
Problems]; see also A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 913-14 (5th ed.
2002).
5. Interstate Water Problems, supra note 4, at 1048-49.
6. Id. at 1049.
7. See Water Compacts, supra note 1, § 46.01, Table of Water Apportionment Compacts.
8. Interstate Water Problems, supra note 4, at 1045-47.
9. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. In 1952, Texas tried to sue New Mexico
over the Rio Grande Compact, Texas v. New Mexico, 343 U.S. 932 (1952), but the Court
dismissed the case because of the absence of the United States as an indispensable party,
Texas v. New Mexico, 353 U.S. 991 (1957).
10. Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101 (1999) (Republican River Compact) (motion for
leave to file complaint granted); Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 484 U.S. 808 (1987) (Canadian
River Compact) (motion for leave to file complaint granted); Kansas v. Colorado, 475 U.S.
1079 (1986) (Arkansas River Compact) (motion for leave to fie complaint granted).
11. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 560-62 (1983) (Pecos River Compact).
12. The Colorado River Compact allocates more water than exists in the river system
because compact negotiators relied on water supply data now known to be inaccurate on
the high side. See DAvID H. GETCHES, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 413,419 & n.13 (1985).
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controversy might well occur as water uses in the basin grow.3 Another
reason to expect more litigation is that compacts typically allocate water
for the long term," and limits of human foresight can result in
unintended drafting omissions and ambiguities. Still another reason is
deliberate omission or ambiguity. Most water allocation compacts were
concluded in order to get federal water project funding that depended
on the states reaching agreement about their shares of the water source."
Compact negotiators had an incentive to omit contentious points or
plaster them over with ambiguity.
6
One of the water compact cases brought to date was settled
before the Court made any findings, 7 but in each of the other three, the
Court found that the defendant state had breached its water delivery
obligation.'8 The breach extended for decades in two of the cases, 9 and
the Court had to address the defendant states' liability for long-
continued breach.20 Prior to these cases, the issue of state liability for
long-continued breach of compact was essentially unexplored, not just
for water allocation compacts but for interstate compacts generally.
The Court has issued three opinions in the two water compact
cases addressing long-continued breach.2 ' These opinions have started
the Court down the path of awarding damages measured by the plaintiff
state's losses for the entire period of breach,2 however long, plus
13. For discussion of growing tensions under the Colorado River Compact, see
generally Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of
Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 114-20 (2003).
14. E.g., Colorado River Compact, art. 111(a), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928)
(apportionment "in perpetuity"); Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, art. XII, 94 Stat.
3305, 3318 (1980) (compact terminable upon agreement of all four signatory states, with
rights established under it continuing in the event of termination).
15. Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48 (1966).
16. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 949.
17. Kansas v. Colorado, 123 S. Ct. 1898 (2003) (decree based on settlement stipulation);
Tri-state Settlement Reached in Republican River Battle, IX NATIONAL WATER RIGHTS DIGEST,
Jan. 2003, at 9.
18. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2001) (Arkansas River Compact); Oklahoma v.
New Mexico, 510 U.S. 126, 126 (1993) (Canadian River Compact); Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124, 127-28 (1987) (Pecos River Compact).
19. See Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. at 6 (recommendation of special master, not
challenged by Colorado, that damages be calculated from 1950); Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. at 127-28.
20. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. at 128, 135.
21. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (Pecos River Compact); Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 675 (1995) (Arkansas River Compact); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1
(2001) (Arkansas River Compact).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78 and 83-84 (Kansas v. Colorado) and notes 54-
64 (Texas v. New Mexico).
Spring 20031
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
compound prejudgment interest for possibly an extended period.3 This
path could lead to huge liability for future defendant states found to be
in breach for decades. The risk is heightened by the Court's ruling that a
state is liable even if it acted in good faith and breached only because it
interpreted ambiguous compact language concerning its water delivery
obligation in a way that the Court later rejects.24
The Court provided a single glimmer of hope for future
defendant states facing liability for long-continued breach. It noted in
one of the opinions that it "has yet to decide whether the doctrine of
laches applies in a case involving the enforcement of an interstate
compact."2 Laches would bar or reduce a defendant state's liability if the
plaintiff state delayed inexcusably in pressing its claim and the delay
prejudiced the defendant.26
After raising hope about a laches defense, however, the Court
immediately noted a potential obstacle: "The common law has long
accepted the principle 'nullum tempus occurrit regi'-neither laches nor
statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign."2 7 The Court did not go on
to decide whether the nullum tempus principle should operate in a
compact enforcement case. Instead, it ended its brief discussion of laches
by saying, "We need not.. .foreclose the applicability of laches in
[compact] cases, because we conclude that Colorado has failed to prove
an element necessary to the recognition of that defense [i.e., inexcusable
delay by the plaintiff state]."28
This article brightens the prospects of states sued for long-
continued breach of water allocation compacts by arguing that nullum
tempus has no place in such litigation. With nullum tempus gone, the
Court should apply laches as readily as in suits brought by non-
sovereign plaintiffs. In addition, the Court might possibly borrow and
apply an analogous statute of limitations as a matter of federal common
law.
Part I below examines the Court's few compact enforcement
cases involving retrospective relief for long-continued breach. Part II
addresses the nullum tempus principle-exploring its genesis, modern
23. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
24. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 129.
25. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 687.
26. See id. Colorado asserted that laches by Kansas barred all relief. Sometimes,
however, laches only reduces the relief awarded. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 142 (1996).
27. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 687 (quoting O'Connor, J., dissenting, in Block v.
North Dakota ex rel Board of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 294 (1983)). In addition,
the Court quoted passages from other cases saying that laches is generally inapplicable in
interstate boundary suits and that delay in suing might well preclude relief or increase the
plaintiff state's burden in equitable apportionment litigation. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at
687-88.
28. Id. at 688.
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rationale, and current status in state courts and the Supreme Court. Part
III argues that nullum tempus does not fit cases between states because its
supporting policy rationale breaks down in the interstate setting and
because its application would be inconsistent with the constitutional
plan for states as members of the Union. Part IV challenges the
conventional wisdom that no statute of limitations is available for the
Court to apply in suits between states. It explores the idea of borrowing
one in water compact enforcement suits, based on extension of the
federal-court practice of borrowing an analogous statute of limitations
when a federal cause of action lacks one that applies by its terms.
Although the extension would not be free from difficulties, part IV
develops arguments to overcome them.
I. THE CASES ON LONG-CONTINUED BREACH OF COMPACT
The Supreme Court does not function in its familiar appellate
role in compact enforcement cases. The Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction of suits between states. The Court is poorly suited to sit as a
trial tribunal. So the Court appoints a special master to handle pre-trial
and evidentiary proceedings and to submit reports recommending how
the Court should dispose of the issues.3
A. Compacts Other Than Water Allocation Compacts
States have formed compacts to address many interstate issues
besides water allocation. These other compacts have seldom been
litigated. Many of them were fully performed upon state ratification or
shortly thereafter.3 0 Others require continuing performance, but states
29. U.S. CONsT., art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (judicial power of United States extends "to
Controversies between two or more States); id., cl. 1 (Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction of "all Cases.. .in which a State shall be a Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)
(Supreme Court's jurisdiction is exclusive if a suit is between two or more states).
30. See generally Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process:
Special Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2002).
31. See Brevard Crihfield, Interstate Compacts, 1783-1977: An Overview, in 22 THE
COUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES: 1978-1979, at 580-81 (1978).
32. E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998) (boundary compact); Nebraska v.
Iowa, 406 U.S. 117 (1972) (boundary compact); Tennessee v. Virginia, 177 U.S. 501 (1900)
(boundary compact). A 1951 study reported that only two compact enforcement cases had
come before the Court as of that time. FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL,
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, at 48 n.193 (1951).
33. ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 32, at 49.
Spring 2003]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
generally behave responsibly and meet their compact obligations unless
the compact language is ambiguous.4
As unusual as compact enforcement litigation is, rarer still is
compact enforcement litigation that involves liability for long-continued
breach. Outside the context of water allocation compacts, a single case
has presented that issue.u There, the Court assumed without discussion
that no statute of limitations applied.3 It also declined to apply laches37
but did not explain whether that was because the doctrine never
operates against a sovereign state or because an essential element of the
doctrine was missing on the facts. In sum, the Court treated the issue of a
statute of limitations so casually and the issue of laches so ambiguously
that the case is not useful precedent on these issues.
B. Water Allocation Compacts
The Supreme Court water allocation compact cases on liability
for long-continued breach involved the Pecos River Compact and the
Arkansas River Compact.3 The Court's opinions in these cases illustrate
how long-continued breach can arise and suggest the potential
magnitude of a breaching state's liability. More importantly, the
opinions state the presently operative legal principles on long-continued
breach and reveal some remaining uncertainties.
1. The Pecos River Compact: Texas v. New Mexico
The Pecos River flows from north-central New Mexico south into
Texas, where it continues until emptying into the Rio Grande. The two
states negotiated the Pecos River Compact in 1948,39 and it became
effective a year later upon state ratification and congressional approval. 4°
New Mexico agreed in the compact not to "deplete by man's activities
the flow of the Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an
amount which will give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that
34. FREDERICK L. ZMMERMAN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTER-
STATE COMPACTS 13 (1976).
35. Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907), 209 U.S. 514 (1908), 220 U.S. 1 (1911),
222 U.S. 17 (1911), 231 U.S. 89 (1913), 234 U.S. 117 (1914), 238 U.S. 202 (1915), 241 U.S. 531
(1916), 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
36. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. at 35-36.
37. The defendant state argued laches at length in its brief. Defendant's Brief at 125-36,
Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S. 202 (1915) (Orig. No. 2). The Court dismissed this
argument, without using the word "laches," by saying that "[t]he lapse of time has not
changed the substance of the agreement," and "[i]t is urged that there are equities to be
considered, but we can find none which go so far as to destroy them." Id. at 236.
38. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554,559 (1983).
40. Id.
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available to Texas under the 1947 condition."41 To quantify that amount
for future years, an engineering advisory committee that assisted the
compact negotiators prepared an inflow-outflow manual. The manual
set out a formula for calculating how much water Texas should receive
at the state line under varying conditions given the 1947 level of water
consumption in New Mexico.42
Soon after the compact went into effect, the inflow-outflow
formula proved to be based on seriously erroneous data and
assumptions. Flows at the state line were far below the inflow-outflow
projections with no significant changes in natural conditions or in man's
activities in New Mexico.4 The two states struggled to adjust for the
errors and seemingly reached agreement in 1962, but thereafter
cooperation between them ceased." They became deadlocked regarding
what changes, if any, should be made in the formula to address the
errors.45 Finally, in 1974, Texas asked the Supreme Court to interpret and
enforce the compact.46 The litigation proceeded slowly as the special
master and the Court addressed various issues.47 A breakthrough
occurred in 1984, when the Court approved a revised inflow-outflow
formula recommended by the special master.' Thereafter, using the new
formula, the special master calculated that New Mexico had shorted
Texas by 340,100 acre-feet from 1950 through 1983.49
To remedy the breach, the special master recommended that the
Court order New Mexico to deliver one-tenth of the accumulated
shortfall to Texas annually for ten years, in addition to the shortfall due
in any future year."M The special master opined that both parties might be
41. Pecos River Compact, art. 111(a), 63 Stat. 159, 161 (1949).
42. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 558-59.
43. Id. at 560.
44. See G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE
PECOS RIVER 122-23 (2002).
45. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 561-62. The compact created a commission
empowered to administer its terms and gave each state one vote on the commission. Id. at
560.
46. Paul Elliott, Texas' Interstate Water Compacts, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1241, 1256 (1986).
The Court granted the Texas motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in Texas v. New
Mexico, 421 U.S. 927 (1975).
47. See Texas v. New Mexico, 446 U.S. 540 (1980) (holding that the term "1947
condition" in the compact referred to actual water use conditions then rather than an
artificial condition defined by the inflow-outflow manual's data and assumptions); Texas v.
New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (defining the Court's role when states are deadlocked
about compact interpretation).
48. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 127 (1987) ("On June 11, 1984, we
summarily approved the Special Master's report specifying the inflow-outflow
methodology to be used in calculating Texas' entitlement.").
49. See id.
50. Id. at 127-28; Special Master's Report (July 1986) at 32-33, 36-37, Texas v. New
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.). The special master also recommended that the
Spring 2003]
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better off with money damages, rather than payment in kind, but he
thought money relief was unavailable because the compact did not
specifically provide for it."
In the Supreme Court, New Mexico opposed the special master's
recommendation on three grounds. First, it argued that the Court could
order only prospective relief, not retrospective relief compensating for
past breaches. The Court disagreed, saying that although congressional
consent makes an interstate compact a law of the United States, a
compact is also a contract,52 and "nothing in the nature of compacts
generally or of this Compact in particular.. .counsels against rectifying a
failure to perform in the past.... Second, New Mexico argued
retrospective relief was inappropriate because its breach was due to a
good-faith misunderstanding of its water delivery obligation under the
compact. The Court did not dispute New Mexico's good faithfm Instead,
it invoked the contract rule that "good-faith differences about the scope
of contractual undertakings do not relieve either party from
performance." 5 Finally, New Mexico argued that if it were held liable to
Texas for the shortfall, it should have the choice of paying in money
rather than in water. The Court rejected the special master's view that
money damages were foreclosed,5 and it remanded the case to him for a
recommendation on whether New Mexico should be allowed to elect a
monetary remedy and, if so, the amount payable. 7 The recovery period
spanned the entire 34 years of breach.- Also, the Court said
Court impose a penalty of "water interest" should New Mexico fail in bad faith to meet the
ten-year repayment schedule. Special Master's Report (July 1986) at 36-37, Texas v. New
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.). This was not prejudgment interest because it
did nothing to compensate for prejudgment breach. It was a limited kind of postjudgment
interest. New Mexico would owe no interest if it complied with the ten-year schedule of the
recommended decree.
51. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130. The special master believed that money
relief was foreclosed by the Court's statement, in an earlier phase of the case, that
congressional consent to a compact makes it a law of the United States, and consequently
no court could order relief inconsistent with its terms. Special Master's Report (July 1986) at
32, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.).
52. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128.
53. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 130.
57. Id. at 132. The Court said payment in kind "has all the earmarks of specific
performance, an equitable remedy that requires some attention to the relative benefits and
burdens that the parties may enjoy or suffer as compared with a legal remedy in damages"
and noted the established principle that specific performance is a discretionary remedy that
will not be awarded if doing so would be inequitable. Id. at 131.
58. The special master calculated the shortfall back to 1950, and the Court did not
indicate any problem with that. Id. at 127-28.
[Vol. 43
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postjudgment interest should be awarded until payment of whatever
judgment might be entered.59
After further proceedings, the parties settled the case for $14
million.6 Texas did not seek prejudgment interest. If it had done so
successfully, New Mexico's liability might have been far larger,
depending on the proper period for assessing such interest.
2. The Arkansas River Compact: Kansas v. Colorado
The Arkansas River flows from the mountains of Colorado into
and through Kansas and two other states before it empties into the
Mississippi River. Colorado and Kansas entered into the Arkansas River
Compact after two unsuccessful attempts by Kansas to get the Supreme
Court to equitably apportion the river.6' The compact became effective
with congressional approval in 1949.62 It obligates Colorado not to
engage in or allow future water development within its borders that will
materially deplete the stateline flow in usable quantity or availability.6 In
1985, Kansas sued Colorado for breaching that obligation." Initially,
Kansas sought only to compel Colorado's future compliance with the
compact." After the Court's opinion in Texas v. New Mexico allowing
retrospective relief, however, Kansas amended its complaint to seek
damages for breach."
The special master bifurcated the litigation, considering breach
first and saving remedial issues.67 He concluded that Colorado breached
the compact by allowing substantial increases in groundwater pumping
commencing in 1950, but he left calculation of the total shortfall for the
remedial phase of the case.6 Colorado asserted the affirmative defense of
lacheso because Kansas did not formally complain to the compact
59. Id. at 132-33 & n.8.
60. Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111 (1990) (stipulated judgment).
61. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902),
206 U.S. 46 (1907).
62. Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S.
673, 678 (1995).
63. Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, art. IV-D, 63 Stat. 145, 147 (1949).
64. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 679.
65. Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support at 5-6, Kansas
v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995), 533 U.S. 1, 24 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.). Justice O'Connor
noted this point in her dissenting opinion. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. at 24 (citing the
special master's third report in the case).
66. First Amended Complaint at 6, Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995), 533 U.S. 1,
24 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.).
67. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 680.
68. Special Master's Report (July 1995) at 263, 290, Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673
(1995), 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.).
69. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673,687 (1995).
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administration agency about excessive Colorado groundwater pumping
until 1984.70 Colorado argued that Kansas delayed inexcusably because it
knew or should have known by 1956, or at least by 1968, that post-
compact groundwater pumping in Colorado had increased
substantially. 71 The special master concluded that Colorado proved
neither inexcusable delay by Kansas nor prejudice to Colorado from the
delay, both elements of laches.'
The Court accepted the master's recommended finding that
post-compact groundwater pumping in Colorado breached the
compact.73 It disposed of Colorado's laches defense by accepting the
master's view that Kansas had not delayed inexcusably in pressing its
claim.74 The Court said Colorado's conduct undermined its laches
defense because Colorado refused, as late as 1985, to let the compact
administration agency investigate groundwater use within its borders by
asserting Kansas lacked evidence that the pumping had an impact on
usable stateline flows.m Because Kansas did not delay inexcusably, the
Court saw no reason to address the undecided legal issue of whether
laches can apply in a compact enforcement suit.76
In the remedial phase of the case, the special master
recommended awarding damages to Kansas for losses from compact
violations by Colorado since 1950 plus prejudgment interest running
from 1969, when Colorado knew or should have known of the
overpumping.7 Having lost previously on its laches argument, Colorado
did not oppose the master's recommendation that the Court award
damages from the commencement of breach. Instead, Colorado only
contested the master's recommended period for prejudgment interest,
arguing that it should run not from 1969 but from 1985 when Kansas
filed suit. 7 Kansas also objected to the master's recommended period for
prejudgment interest, asserting that it should run from 1950.79 Kansas
claimed damages of $62 million, consisting of $9 million for direct and
70. Id. at 688.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 680-81.
73. Id. at 693-94.
74. Id. at 688-89.
75. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 689 (1995).
76. Id. at 687-88.
77. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 6 (2001). The attorney for Kansas stated during oral
argument on objections to the special master's report that the concluded Colorado
underdelivery of water from 1950 through 1994 was approximately 420,000 acre-feet. See
Transcript of Oral Argument of John B. Draper (Mar. 19, 2001), Kansas v. Colorado, 514
U.S. 673 (1995), 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/ 105orig.pdf.
78. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. at 12.
79. Id. at 6.
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indirect losses, $12 million to adjust for inflation, and $41 million of
prejudgment interest based on compounding from the time of breach.8"
The Court divided three ways on the proper period for
prejudgment interest. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of four
Justices, favored awarding prejudgment interest from 1969. He
recognized that the common law traditionally denied prejudgment
interest on unliquidated claims.8' But he said that by 1949, when the
parties negotiated and ratified the compact, the Court had "consistently
acknowledged that a monetary award does not fully compensate for an
injury unless it includes an interest component", 2 and therefore had been
awarding prejudgment interest when "'considerations of fairness'
demand it."' He concluded that when Colorado entered into the
compact, it should have expected the Court to balance the equities under
the fairness standard.84
Stevens accepted the special master's assessment of the
equities." Weighing in favor of prejudgment interest was the need to
fully compensate Kansas for the economic consequences of Colorado's
breach.6 Weighing against it were the reality that no one "had any
thought" the compact was being violated in its early years, 7 "the long
interval [that] passed between the original injuries and these
proceedings,"88 and "the dramatic impact of compounding interest over
many years." 9 These factors led to the conclusion that prejudgment
interest should run only from 1969, when Colorado knew or should have
known of the overpumping. 9°
Justice O'Connor, joined by two other Justices, opposed any
prejudgment interest.9' She said that when the states negotiated and
ratified the compact, the Court had not yet abandoned the venerable
common law rule against prejudgment interest on unliquidated and
80. Id. at 10 n.2 (Stevens, J.), 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). For further
information regarding the inflation adjustment, see infra note 103.
81. Id. at 9-10.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 11 n. 4 (2001) (quoting Board of Comm'rs of Jackson
County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)). He also noted that the Court's case law
had not sufficiently developed by 1949 to give Colorado notice it would automatically be
liable for prejudgment interest beginning at the time of injury. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S.
at 13-14.
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 15 n.5.
86. Id. at 10-11.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
89. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001).
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. at 20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.).
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unascertainable claims. Therefore, she saw no basis to say the two states
intended or expected any award of prejudgment interest for breach of
the compact." Moreover, she thought the Court's cases awarded
prejudgment interest only upon considerations of fairness, rather than
any rigid theory of compensation. 94 She saw nothing fair about awarding
prejudgment interest when the parties "neither intended nor
contemplated such an unconventional remedy."95
Two Justices, neither of whom wrote an opinion, thought
prejudgment interest should run from the time Kansas filed suit in 1985.96
To enable the Court to enter a judgment, the four Justices who favored
prejudgment interest from 1969 joined the two who favored 1985 to
produce a six-to-three majority for awarding prejudgment interest from
1985.97 The Court remanded the case to the special master for calculation
of final damages.9
The Court's opinions in Kansas v. Colorado leave uncertain the
law on retrospective relief for breach of a water allocation compact. The
Court left undecided whether the defense of laches would operate in a
compact enforcement case. In addition, the Court's result on
prejudgment interest represented a compromise that raises presently
unanswerable questions. One can only guess about why two Justices
thought prejudgment interest should not begin to run until Kansas filed
suit in 1985. Was their conclusion based on particular facts in the case, or
was it based on some broad rule applicable generally to breach of
compact cases?
Justice Stevens' opinion adds another uncertainty. Although he
said Supreme Court caselaw had not developed sufficiently by 1949 to
put Colorado on notice that prejudgment interest would be awarded
automatically from the time of breach, rather than under considerations
of fairness, he also said there was "some merit" to Kansas's position that
the Court's more recent cases had disapproved a balancing-of-the-
equities limitation on awarding prejudgment interest.? Would he award
prejudgment interest automatically, under the rubric of full
compensation, for breach of compacts negotiated and ratified after the
92. Id. at 21-24.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id. at 25.
95. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 25 (2001).
96. Id. at 15 n.5.
97. Id. Justice Stevens also seemed to be influenced by the facts that the damages were
unquantified; their quantification would require complex and protracted litigation, "it was
uniquely in Kansas' power to begin the process [sooner] by which those damages would be
quantified." Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 10 n.2, 20.
99. Id. at 13-14.
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Court's more recent cases that rejected the balancing approach? If so,
would he also award prejudgment interest automatically for earlier
compacts as to breaches commencing or occurring after those recent
cases? In other words, would the relevant time for ascertaining what the
compacting states should have expected under governing caselaw be
when the breach commences or occurs rather than when the states
ratified the compact? In Kansas v. Colorado, ratification and commence-
ment of breach were so close together that this issue did not arise.
O'Connor's position is also unclear. She opposed any pre-
judgment interest on the ground that the Court's caselaw as of 1949 did
not allow it upon unliquidated and unascertainable claims. She
acknowledged, however, that, at least by 1962, the Court was awarding
prejudgment interest on considerations of faimess.Ym Would she treat
compacts negotiated and ratified after 1962 differently than the 1949
Arkansas River Compact?
3. Summary and Observations
Texas v. New Mexico and Kansas v. Colorado illustrate two ways
that litigation can arise regarding long-continued breach of a water
allocation compact. Texas v. New Mexico arose because the formula in the
Pecos River Compact for allocating water between the two states was
based on flawed data. The two states sought to work through the
difficulties with the formula, but cooperation between them ceased after
about 15 years. A dozen more years passed before one of them sought
judicial resolution of the disagreement. In Kansas v. Colorado, neither state
"had any thought" during the early years of the compact that increased
groundwater pumping in Colorado would materially reduce the
streamflow into Kansas' 0 1 Perhaps the reason for their lack of awareness
was that ground water moves very slowly, and years or decades may
pass before the pumping of ground water tributary to a stream reduces
its flow.
102
Texas v. New Mexico established that retrospective compensatory
relief is available for breach of a water allocation compact and that
(depending on unelucidated factors) compensation might be in water or
in money. Kansas v. Colorado established that the award of compensatory
damages can include prejudgment interest though the claim was
unliquidated until judgment. Uncertainty remains about the period for
which prejudgment interest can be recovered. Until the uncertainty is
100. Id. at 25 (citing Blau v. Hehman, 368 U.S. 402 (1962)).
101. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001).
102. See, e.g., Dist. 10 Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett, 599 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1979) (expert
testimony of 40-year lag between pumping tributary ground water and depletion of
streamflow).
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clarified, future plaintiff states can be expected to seek interest back at
least to the time the defendant state knew or should have known of the
breach. They might even seek it all the way back to the commencement
of breach on either of two theories. One would be that a balancing of the
equities in a particular fact situation justifies that. The other would be
based on Justice Stevens' remark that there is "some merit" to the view
that the Court's more recent cases treat the compensation principle as
important enough to justify the automatic award of prejudgment interest
back to the commencement of breach. Future plaintiff states might argue
this supports automatic prejudgment interest for breach of the more
recently approved compacts and perhaps also for more recent breaches
of older compacts.
Under Texas v. New Mexico and Kansas v. Colorado, a state that is
sued for long-continued breach of an interstate water allocation compact
faces potentially huge liability even though it might have acted in good
faith in interpreting its compact obligation differently than the Court
ultimately does. While such a state will surely argue for a narrow
interpretation of Kansas v. Colorado regarding prejudgment interest, there
is no knowing whether that argument will succeed. Even if the period
for prejudgment interest is limited significantly, the damages for direct
and indirect losses due to decades of water delivery shortfalls can reach
considerable magnitude, especially if adjusted for inflation' 3 Further-
more, many citizens of the defendant state who benefited from the extra
water due to the breach of the compact may be gone and be replaced by
a new generation of taxpayers who will think it especially unfair that
they should bear the burden of the judgment."° Future defendant states
surely will want to limit the period for which they are liable. They cannot
103. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. During oral argument in Kansas v.
Colorado, the following exchange occurred:
QUESTION: Did you-was there an inflationary factor added so that the
damages, say for the early sixties were computed in 1995 or year 2000
dollars?
MR. DRAPER: For the years that were denied prejudgment interest
treatment, 1950 through 1968, the Special Master did adjust those, at the
suggestion of Colorado, not on the basis of principal [sic], but simply
because Colorado was not objecting to that. Those are adjusted, which is
only a fraction of the time value of money that occurred from that period
to the present.
Transcript of Oral Argument, 2001 WL 300643, *9-10 (Mar. 19, 2001), Kansas v. Colorado,
514 U.S. 673 (1995), 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.).
104. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, 2001 WL 300643, *10 (Mar. 19, 2001), Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995), 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.).
QUESTION: But the people who are paying are really the present
taxpayers, and they're paying for something that older generations of
taxpayers maybe didn't do, and it could be horrendous amounts, if you
have a violation that's 200 years old, as you could in a different case.
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succeed without overcoming the principle that neither laches nor
statutes of limitations bar the sovereign.
II. THE NULLUM TEMPUS PRINCIPLE
The principle that laches and statutes of limitations do not bar
the sovereign traces back to the ancient English maxim quod nullum
tempus occurrit regi,I°n which translates literally as "no time runs against
the king."' °6 The principle is broader than literal translation would
indicate. It encompasses laches as well as statutes of limitations'07 even
though laches requires more than the passage of time, namely, delay by
the plaintiff that is inexcusable and that prejudices the defendant.1°8
Proper application of the nullum tempus principle depends on
understanding the reasons why courts have said laches and statutes of
limitations do not bar the sovereign.
A. The Historical and Modem Rationales for the Principle
In England, nullum tempus was grounded in royal prerogative9
Statutes of limitations generally did not bar the king because no act of
parliament bound the king unless the act expressly named him or
necessarily implied that he was included."0 Laches did not bar the king
because he was too busy looking after the public welfare to be expected
to bring timely suit, and he should not have to suffer from the neglect of
his officers in failing to do so."'
The American Revolution undercut the royal-prerogative
foundation for nullum tempus in the United States. Nonetheless, early
American courts uniformly accepted the nullum tempus principle."2 They
discovered an appealing new function for it that Joseph Story, writing as
a circuit judge, set forth as follows:
105. United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 329-30 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821).
106. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, app. A (7th ed. 1999).
107. E.g., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 294
(1983) ("neither laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign") (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938) ("the sovereign is
exempt from the consequences of its laches, and from the operations of statutes of
limitations"); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486,489 (1878).
108. E.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673,687 (1995) (quoting Costello v. United States,
365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) and also relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY); Gardner v. Panama
R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951).
109. X WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 354-55 (1956).
110. Id. The king was implicitly included if the act was for the public good and it would
have been absurd to exempt him. Id.
111. Id.at355.
112. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938).
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The true reason [for nullum tempus] is to be found in the
great public policy of preserving the public rights,
revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the
negligence of public officers. And though this is sometimes
called a prerogative right, it is in fact nothing more than a
reservation, or exception, introduced for the public benefit,
and equally applicable to all governments.1
3
The public will benefit, of course, if the neglect of public officers to
pursue claims punctually does not bar the sovereign from later obtaining
injunctive relief that preserves public rights or monetary relief that
augments public assets.
Although early American courts uniformly accepted the nullum
tempus principle, not all modem state courts and legislatures embrace it.
Some state courts have limited the principle to higher levels of
government and excluded political subdivisions of the state from its
benefit.1 14 Some state legislatures have enacted statutes of limitations for
certain causes of action that expressly include the sovereign. And some
state courts"' or legislatures"' have abrogated the nullum tempus
principle either completely or nearly so.
In addition, state courts have disagreed about whether nullum
ternpus survives the modem demise of another attribute of traditional
sovereignty, namely, immunity from suit without consent. Some courts
say that even though nullum tempus and immunity from suit have a
common ancestry in royal prerogative, nullum tempus is sufficiently
different to survive."" They point out that historically immunity from
113. United States v. Hoar, 26 F.Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (Story, J.).
114. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d 776,778-79 & nn.4-5 (Colo.
1992) (collecting cases taking different views).
115. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201 (1999) (suits based on written contacts);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-2 (2002) (suits in respect to real property or the issues or profits
thereof). The public benefit function articulated by Story does not immunize an American
sovereign from a statute of limitations that expressly includes it any more than royal
prerogative insulated the king from acts of parliament that expressly included him. E.g.,
State v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 412 (S.C. 2000): "Under the nullum tempus
doctrine, statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign unless the legislature
specifically provides otherwise."
116. E.g., Shootman v. Dep't of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1204-06 (Colo. 1996); New Jersey
Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 563-64 (N.J. 1991).
117. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.360 (2002) ("The limitations prescribed in sections
516.010 to 516.370 shall apply to actions brought in the name of this state, or for its benefit,
in the same manner as to actions by private parties."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-19 (2000)
("Every statute of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the
State.").
118. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. 1983); Ohio
Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798 (Oh. 1988); Oklahoma City Mun. Improvement
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suit was grounded in the idea that the king can do no wrong rather than
the ideas supporting nullum tempus, i.e., that acts of parliament generally
do not apply to the king, and the king is too busy to sue punctually and
should not suffer from the neglect of his officers to do so.n+
More importantly, these courts stress that the two immunity
doctrines provide different protections to American sovereigns.
Immunity from suit protects the sovereign as a defendant in litigation,
enabling it to shield public finances from depletion due to the neglect or
malfeasance of public officers.20 In contrast, nullum ternpus protects the
sovereign as plaintiff in litigation, enabling it to preserve public rights
and public property despite the neglect of public officers to sue more
promptly."" Thus, say these courts, immunity from suit does not protect
a sovereign's citizens against violation of their public rights while nullum
tempus does.ln This added function of nullum tempus, they say, justifies its
continued survival despite abrogation of the state's immunity from suit
without consent.13
Other courts, however, have concluded that abrogation of
immunity from suit leads also to the demise of nullum tempus.7 ' They
stress that both immunity from suit and immunity from time bars are
aspects of sovereign immunity.In They reason that once the sovereign
has "yielded the greatest aspect of sovereign immunity, immunity from
any suit at all, it would be anomalous in the extreme not to conclude that
the sovereign who can now be sued should not have to bring its own suit
in a timely manner."'26 They are unimpressed by the asserted distinction
between a sovereign as defendant and a sovereign as plaintiff: "Both
liability avoidance [immunity from suit] and public rights preservation
[immunity from time bars].. .provide protection for the public fisc. We
are not persuaded that the distinction supplies an adequate basis in
Auth. v. HTB Inc., 769 P.2d 131 (Okla. 1988); Commonwealth v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439
A.2d 101 (Pa. 1981).
119. E.g., Commonwealth v. J.W. Bishop, 439 A.2d at 103-04.
120. E.g., id. at 104.
121. E.g., id.
122. Id.
123. See City of Shelbyville, 451 N.E.2d at 877:
Inasmuch as citizens who share a public right which has been violated
may be unable in certain cases to bring suit on their own behalf while the
government has a representative interest in the controversy [citations
omitted], abolition of the government's immunity from limitations
defenses would expose these citizens to the harsh consequences of neglect
by officials over whose actions they had no control.
124. Shootman v. Dep't of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200 (Colo. 1996); New Jersey Educ.
Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1991); State ex. rel. Condon v. City of
Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000).
125. E.g., New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen, 592 A.2d at 561.
126. Id.
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policy to justify retaining nullum tempus while rejecting sovereign
immunity.',27 This statement links protection of the public fisc and
protection of public rights, apparently because public rights usually can
be protected through use of the public fisc, i.e., by eminent domain or
other expenditures.
In sum, these latter courts reason that once a state concludes that
the public fisc benefits cease to justify sovereign immunity from suit, the
public fisc justification for nullum tempus also loses its force. Then the
only remaining policy justification for nullum tempus is its role in
enabling stale suits to protect public rights; and since public rights can
often be protected by public expenditures, this role is minor enough to
be outweighed by the standard policies behind laches and statutes of
limitation128
B. Nullum Tempus in the Supreme Court
Only three years after Story's circuit court opinion setting out
the public-benefit rationale for nullum tempus in America, the Supreme
Court embraced it-not surprisingly, in an opinion by Story.' 29 The Court
has continued since then to treat public benefit as the basis for nullum
tempus."
In most of the Supreme Court's nullum tempus cases, a sovereign
was suing one of its citizens.13' These cases establish beyond doubt that
127. Shootman, 926 P.2d at 1206 n.8.
128. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d at 413-14, describes the policies behind statutes of
limitations as follows:
Parties should act before memories dim, evidence grows stale or becomes
nonexistent, or other people act in reliance on what they believe is a settled
state of public affairs. Statutes of limitations embody important public
policy considerations in that they stimulate activity, punish negligence,
and promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. One
purpose of a statute of limitations is to relieve the courts of the burden of
trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. Another
purpose.. .is to protect potential defendants from protracted fear of
litigation.
Citing Moates v. Bobb, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996). These principles ring true
regardless of whether the party is a private individual, a corporation, or a governmental
entity.
129. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735 (1824).
130. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto)
486, 488-89 (1878); United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 315 (1840). Accordingly, the
Court applies nullum tempus only when a sovereign is asserting a public right or the public
interest, not when it is merely the nominal plaintiff suing solely to benefit a private person.
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344, 347 (1888).
131. That is true, for example, of the cases cited supra notes 129-130.
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nullum tempus operates in that situation. Whether nullum tempus also
operates when both parties are sovereign states is not settled.
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court made the statement reported in
the introduction of this article: "This Court has yet to decide whether the
doctrine of laches applies in a case involving the enforcement of an
interstate compact." 132 This statement appears to have been accurate
when the Court made it in 1 9 9 5 ,i3 and the laches issue has remained
undecided since then.'3'
In contrast to the lack of Supreme Court authority on laches in
compact enforcement suits, the Court squarely addressed the issue of
applying a statute of limitations in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.35
Although that was not a compact enforcement suit, it presented a similar
situation in that one state sued another to enforce the boundary between
them as established by their colonial charters.36 The Court gave the
following reasons why no statute of limitations should apply:
[H]ere two political communities are concerned, who
cannot act with the same promptness as individuals; the
boundary in question was in a wild unsettled country, and
the error [made in locating the boundary on the ground]
not likely to be discovered, until the lands were granted by
the respective colonies, and the settlements approached the
disputed line; and the only tribunal that could relieve, after
the mistake was discovered, was on the other side of the
Atlantic, and not bound to hear the case and proceed to
judgment, except when it suited its own convenience. 37
132. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673,687 (1995).
133. See Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 388 (1991) (stating in dictum that laches "is
generally inapplicable against a State," but citing as authority only cases that were not suits
between states); Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907), 209 U.S. 514 (1908), 220 U.S.
1 (1911), 222 U.S. 17 (1911), 231 U.S. 89 (1913), 234 U.S. 117 (1914), 238 U.S. 202 (1915), 241
U.S. 531 (1916), 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (initially expressing interest in applying laches, 220 U.S.
at 35-36, but later disregarding it without explaining whether that was because nullum
tenpus precluded laches or because an essential element of laches was missing, 238 U.S. at
234-35); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838), 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210
(1840), 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233 (1841), 45 U.S. 591 (1846) (initially indicating laches might
apply, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 714, but not developing this possibility later).
134. In New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 806 (1998), a boundary case, the Court
noted that Kansas v. Colorado had recognized "the possibility.. .that a laches defense may be
available in some cases founded upon interstate compacts." The Court saw no reason to
explore that possibility, however, because New York was not really asserting the defense of
laches. Id.
135. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838), 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210 (1840), 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233 (1841),
45 U.S. (4 How.) 591 (1846).
136. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 714.
137. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 273.
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This statement reflects a variation of the English busy-king rationale for
nullum tempus, embellished by the difficulty in discovering the factual
basis for a cause of action and in accessing a judicial forum.
In evaluating the present force of the statement, it should be
noted that Rhode Island discovered the boundary mistake in 1740,1" long
before there was a U.S. Supreme Court with jurisdiction to hear
interstate controversies. Unlike litigation between colonies, suits between
states no longer are delayed by the need for trans-Atlantic filing of
papers carried by ship. More importantly, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts
arose before the judiciary tempered statutes of limitation with a
discovery rule that defers when they commence running, first in medical
malpractice cases and later in other cases.139 To whatever extent it
appears that a state cannot act with the same promptness as individuals,
the discovery rule can accommodate that. Similarly, to whatever extent
the relevant hydrologic facts in a water compact enforcement suit might
not have been immediately apparent to the plaintiff state, the discovery
rule can adequately account for that. Therefore, Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts is dubious precedent today against applying a statute of
limitations in compact enforcement suits.14°
III. THE UNSUITABILITY OF NULLUM TEMPUS IN COMPACT
ENFORCEMENT SUITS
For two independent reasons, nullum tempus should not operate
in suits between states for breach of compact. The first is that the public-
benefit rationale for it breaks down in such suits. The second is that
nullum tempus does not fit the constitutional plan for states as equal
members of the Union.
A. Break Down of the Public-Benefit Rationale
The public-benefit rationale for nullum tempus is apt when a
sovereign brings a stale suit against one of its citizens to protect public
revenue, property, or rights. In this situation, the U.S. Supreme Court
has said application of nullum tempus "is supportable.. .because its
138. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 270.
139. "[L]ower federal courts 'generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a statute is
silent on the issue."' TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27 (2001) (quoting from Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000), but noting the Court has never decided whether to adopt
the same approach). The discovery rule traces back to medical malpractice cases in the
1950s and early 1960s. 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 11.1.2 (1991).
140. Nor is the language quoted above from Illinois v. Kentucky-regarding use of
prescription and acquiescence rather than laches and statutes of limitations in boundary
suits between states-an insurmountable problem. See infra note 236.
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benefit and advantage extend to every citizen, including the defendant,
whose plea of laches or limitation it precludes.....
In contrast, when a state brings a stale suit to protect public
revenue, property, or rights and the defendant is another state, rather
than one of the plaintiff state's citizens, the public consequences of
applying nullum tempus differ significantly. The plaintiff state's recovery
will benefit its citizens, but another body of citizens-those of the
defendant state-will be harmed by their state's need to comply with the
judgment imposing retrospective relief. In this situation, nullum tempus
has double-edged public consequences. At the same time that it protects
the plaintiff state's citizens from the neglect of their public officials to
pursue a claim reasonably promptly, it undercuts the protection that
laches and limitations statutes would otherwise provide to the defendant
state's citizens against stale claims arising from the neglect (or good faith
mistake) of their public officers to perform an obligation owed to the
plaintiff state.
The significance of the double-edged public consequences of
nullum tempus in a suit between states emerges from analysis of the
Court's treatment of nullum tempus in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States."2 There, Russia sued a New York bank in a New York federal
district court to recover a deposit it made with the bank many years
earlier." The Supreme Court held that the New York statute of
limitations barred Russia's claim notwithstanding the sovereign's
assertion of nullum tempus.1" To explain why, the Court set out what it
called "the guiding principle" on the applicability of nullum tempus:
By voluntarily appearing in the role of suitor [a sovereign]
subjects itself to the procedure and rules of decision
governing the forum .... [T]hose rules, which must be
assumed to be founded on principles of justice applicable to
individuals, are to be relaxed only in response to some
persuasive demand of public policy generated by the
nature of the suitor or of the claim which it asserts. 1'
The Court distilled this guiding principle from cases in which the
plaintiff was a domestic sovereign, but it said the principle should apply
also when the plaintiff is a foreign sovereign."
141. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938).
142. 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
143. Id. at 129-30.
144. Id. at 132-36.
145. Id. at 134-35.
146. Id.
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In Guaranty Trust, the forum rule of decision at issue was the
New York statute of limitations. The question was whether some public
policy demanded that this limitations period be "relaxed," i.e., rendered
inoperative, against the sovereign suitor, Russia. To decide the question,
the Court engaged in a weighing process. It weighed the principles of
justice underlying the statute of limitations against the public benefit that
would accrue from applying nullum tempus to avoid the limitations
period:
The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to
protect the citizens from stale and vexatious claims, and to
make an end to the possibility of litigation after the lapse of
a reasonable time. It has long been regarded by this Court
and by the courts of New York as a meritorious defense, in
itself serving a public interest. Denial of its protection
against the demand of the domestic sovereign in the
interest of the domestic community of which the debtor is a
part could hardly be thought to argue for a like surrender
of the local interest in favor of a foreign sovereign and the
community which it represents. We cannot say that the
public interest of the forum goes so far.'
Because application of nullum tempus would not benefit citizens of the
forum community, the statute of limitations operated against Russia's
claim and barred it.
Regarding the weighing process, several fact patterns can be
differentiated. One is where a foreign sovereign sues a private defendant
from the forum state. This was Guaranty Trust: Russia sued a New York
bank in a New York federal district court. The case was an easy one for
not relaxing the New York statute of limitations. The Court regarded the
public policies behind the limitations period as "meritorious," and it
treated the public benefit from applying nullum tempus as
inconsequential because there would be no benefit to forum citizens.
A second fact pattern is where a sovereign sues one of its
citizens. The Court was referring to this situation when it said
application of nullum tempus "is supportable because its benefit and
advantage extend to every citizen, including the defendant, whose plea
of laches or limitation it precludes."" The courts that apply nullum
tempus in this fact pattern have made the judgment, at least implicitly,
that the public benefit of protecting the sovereign's citizens against
neglect by its officers outweighs the policies behind laches and
limitations statutes.
147. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,136 (1938).
148. Id. at 132.
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A third fact pattern is where a state sues another state, e.g., for
breach of compact. As noted earlier, the public consequences of applying
nullum tempus here are double-edged: the plaintiff state's recovery on a
stale claim benefits its citizens but harms the defendant state's citizens. If
the calculation of public consequences is not to be myopic, it must
consider not only the benefit to the plaintiff state's citizens but also the
harm to the defendant state's citizens. The harm to the defendant state's
citizens will weigh against applying the nullum tempus principle. The
crucial question is whether that harm outweighs the benefit of nullum
tempus to the plaintiff state's citizens. Which is greater: the public harm
or the public benefit?
Cases applying nullum tempus in the second fact pattern are of
little relevance to this question because no harmful public consequences
occur when the defendant is a private party from the plaintiff state. It is
one thing to conclude, as many courts have done implicitly in the second
fact pattern, that the public consequences of nullum tempus outweigh the
public policies behind laches and limitations when the public
consequences of nullurn tempus are solely beneficial. It is quite a different
matter when the public consequences include harm as well as benefit.
When the double-edged public consequences in the third fact
pattern are considered, the public harm to the defendant's citizens will
counterbalance either partially or fully the public benefit to the plaintiff's
citizens. Even if the counterbalancing is only partial, the net public
benefit of nullurn tempus (that is, the benefit to citizens of the plaintiff
state minus the harm to citizens of the defendant state) might well fail to
outweigh the public interests served by laches and limitations. More
likely, however, the public harm to the defendant's citizens will fully
counterbalance the public benefit to the plaintiff's citizens. A judgment
awarding retrospective relief, in money or in water, for breach of a water
compact generally will deprive the defendant state's citizens of as much
in dollars or water as the plaintiff state's citizens would gain in dollars or
water. Then the public harm and public benefit will be equal, and the
harm will fully counterbalance the gain. A net public benefit of zero from
applying nullum tempus could hardly outweigh the meritorious public
policies behind laches and limitations periods.49
149. A possible complexity might be noted. The forum for a compact enforcement suit
between states is the Supreme Court. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Therefore,
the relevant domestic community for calculating the public harm and benefit arguably
should not be just a single state's citizens, as in Guaranty Trust, but the national, or at least
regional, community of citizens. Moreover, the harm-benefit calculation for applying
nullum tempus arguably should look beyond the case before the Court and should account
for the possibility that although the defendant state's citizens will not benefit from nullum
tempus in that particular case, they might benefit in the future if their state were to bring a
stale suit against some other state. If these arguments are accepted, the public benefit from
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B. The Constitutional Plan for States as Members of the Union
The discussion below argues that the constitutional plan for
states entails abrogation of sovereign immunity from time bars in suits
between states. The argument relies on elements of two constitutional
provisions governing the relationship of states to each other: first, the
surrender of a state's immunity from suit by another state that is implicit
in Article III, Section 2, and, second, the concept of a Union of states in
Article IV, Section 3.
To focus the discussion, it may be useful to distinguish a
superficially similar topic discussed earlier, namely, whether a state's
abrogation of its sovereign immunity from suit entails ending its
sovereign immunity from laches and limitations statutes.liu There, the
question was whether a state that surrenders its immunity from
becoming a defendant can still assert immunity from time bars when it is
a plaintiff. That situation concerned one state and two lawsuits in which
the state has different postures-defendant in one, plaintiff in the other.
In contrast, the topic discussed below is whether a state suing another
state retains its immunity from time bars when the defendant state has
surrendered its immunity from suit. This situation involves two states
and one lawsuit. At issue is the relationship between different states in a
single suit. More specifically, at issue is the constitutional plan regarding
their relationship in the suit.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution extends the judicial
power of the United States to certain suits against states.1 It says
nothing about whether states retain a sovereign's traditional immunity
applying nullum tempus would include not only the benefit to the plaintiff state's citizens in
the particular case but also the potential benefit to the defendant state's citizens in future
litigation. But the public harm from nullum tempus would also have to include deferred
harm to the citizen of other states associated with future litigation. As with the narrower
approach to public harm and benefit discussed in the text, the broader calculation of public
harm often will fully counterbalance the broader calculation of public benefit. Thus, the
complexity of broadening the harm-benefit calculation should not change the outcome
suggested in the text.
150. See supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
151. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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from suit without consent. The omission does not mean the states
broadly lost immunity from suit in the federal courts upon entering the
Union. According to the Supreme Court, state immunity from suit does
not depend on the "mere literal.. .words of [section] 2 of article 3 1152
because "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control." 15 3 One tacit postulate is "that States
of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune
from suits without their consent, save where there has been a surrender
of this immunity in the plan of the [constitutional] convention."'- Thus,
state immunity from suit remains except so far as it is surrendered in the
constitutional plan.
The constitutional plan, in Article III, Section 2, gives the
Supreme Court jurisdiction over "Controversies between two or more
States. " '51 The Court has noted that in such cases, one of the states
necessarily must be the defendant." Consequently, the Court has
concluded that when the original states ratified the Constitution, they
surrendered their immunity from suit by another state. 5 7 Similarly, the
Court has said that newer states consented to give up this immunity
when they entered the Union.1 8
152. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
153. Id. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
[W]hen the Constitution is ambiguous or silent on a particular issue, this
Court has often relied on notions of a constitutional plan-the implicit
ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the
Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision
within that document the full effect intended by the Framers. The tacit
postulates yielded by that ordering are as much engrained in the fabric of
the document as its express provisions, for without them the Constitution
is denied force and often meaning.
154. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322-23 (quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("the States entered the federal system
with their sovereignty intact [and] the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this
sovereignty").
155. U.S. CONST. art. IUl, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend.. .to Controversies
between two or more States."). See also id. at cl. 2 ("In all Cases.. .in which a State shall be
party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.")
156. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-51 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.), id. at
466-67 (opinion of Cushing, J.), id. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
157. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 328; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720
(1838); see also Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. at 782 (acknowledging the waiver); cf
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380-84 (1821) (waiver of state sovereign immunity is
contained in art. III provisions extending judicial power to all cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States and giving the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction if a state is a party).
158. Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290,319 (1907).
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The constitutional plan, in Article IV, Section 3, makes the states
members of "this Union."'59 The Court has interpreted this phrase to
mean "a union of states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution.""' Moreover, the Court has
specifically recognized that the postulate of equal sovereign power,
dignity, and authority extends to the relationship of states when they are
opposing litigants. They "come to the Court on an equal footing."
61
The equal footing of states in litigation means that neither state's
law applies to the other state.62 Instead, the Court creates and applies
federal interstate common law.'6 This body of law seeks to resolve
litigation between states "in such a way as will recognize the equal rights
of both and at the same time establish justice between them."" Perhaps
the most well-developed part of federal interstate common law concerns
the rights of states on an interstate river to use its waters when they have
not negotiated a compact. The Court applies a doctrine of equitable
apportionment of benefits," under which "[n]either [state] is entitled to
any special priority over the other with respect to the use of water.""
A logical extension of the equal power, dignity, and authority of
states in litigation would be that the defendant state's surrender of its
immunity from suit implies reciprocal surrender by the plaintiff state of
its immunity from laches and limitations statutes. Under Article III,
Section 2, the defendant impliedly consented to the suit and cannot raise
the defense of sovereign immunity. The defendant comes before the
Court as a sovereign stripped of power and authority to protect its
citizens from depletion of the public fisc to satisfy liability arising from
the neglect (or good faith mistake) of their public officials. If the plaintiff
were allowed to come before the Court retaining power and authority to
159. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union...."
160. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S 559, 567 (1911). See also California ex rel. State Lands
Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281 n.9 (1982) ("all States.. possess the same rights
and sovereignty").
161. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 327 (1984) (quoting Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 191 (1982)) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
162. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
163. Id. at 97-98.
164. Id. at 98; accord Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024 n.8 (1983)
(quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46).
165. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 118 ("the equitable apportionment of benefits
between the two states resulting from the flow of the river").
166. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 191 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In a
later phase of the case, the Court applied Chief Justice Burger's statement to the facts of the
case: "Colorado is not entitled to any priority simply because the river originates in
Colorado, and New Mexico is not entitled to an undiminished flow simply because of its
first use." Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 327.
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protect its citizens from the neglect of their public officials to assert the
claim reasonably promptly, the two states would hardly be on an equal
footing regarding protection of their citizens from the neglect of their
public officials. The asymmetry of the state's positions would be at odds
with equal power and authority of states to exert their sovereignty for
the benefit of their citizens. Neither state should be entitled to any
special status not enjoyed by the other regarding protection of its citizens
from the neglect of their public officials. Since surrender of the defendant
state's immunity from suit is a given under Article III, Section 2, equality
between states under Article IV, Section 3, should entail that the plaintiff
state surrenders its immunity from time bars.
IV. A BORROWED LIMITATIONS PERIOD
The preceding section argued that nullum tempus has no place in
water compact enforcement suits because the public-benefit rationale for
it breaks down and because applying it would conflict with the equal
power and authority of litigating states as members of the Union.
Without nullum tempus operating, laches would be available in water
compact enforcement suits as readily as in suits by nonsovereign
plaintiffs. Whether a statute of limitations would also be available is
more complicated. The discussion below explains the complications and
seeks to resolve them.
A. Borrowing a Statute of Limitations
Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations that by its terms
includes breach of compact actions. It has enacted a residual four-year
statute of limitations for any civil action that arises under an act of
Congress passed after December 1, 1990.167 The date excludes all but the
two most recent water allocation compacts.1" Those two are excluded as
well unless "act of Congress" is read broadly, 9 for Congress consented
to them by joint resolution rather than by formal act of Congress."7 Thus,
167. Title III, § 313(a) of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2000), and further amended by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
168. See Water Compacts, supra note 1, at § 46.01 (table showing dates of congressional
consent to the water allocation compacts).
169. Cf. Browsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 768 n.7 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("a joint
resolution passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President (or repassed
over the President's veto) is legislation having the same force as any other Act of
Congress").
170. See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104,
111 Stat. 2219 (1997); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105,
111 Stat. 2233 (1997). Neither of these compacts is yet operative. See Water Compacts, supra
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for all of the water allocation compacts, or at least all but two of them,
neither a specific nor residual statute of limitations would apply of its
own force to a suit for long-continued breach.
This does not mean, however, that no statute of limitations can
apply. When Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for a
federal cause of action, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
regularly borrow an analogous one if Congress would likely have
intended them to do so.7" This borrowing practice has two requisites: the
cause of action must be federal and it must be likely Congress would
have intended borrowing. The discussion below argues that suits for
breach of an interstate water allocation compact meet both requirements.
1. Breach of Compact as a Federal Cause of Action
The borrowing practice applies whether the federal cause of
action derives from federal statute " or federal common law.17 A suit for
breach of a water allocation compact should fit within one of these two
categories, even if the exact one might be debatable.
Arguably, the suit would be based on a federal statute or the
equivalent thereof. The Compact Clause of the Constitution ' 74 requires
the consent of Congress for states to form water allocation compacts."
Congressional consent, says the Court, "transforms an interstate
compact... into a law of the United States."1 76 The Court has specifically
note 1, § 46.03 (Supp. 2002). Congress usually gives its consent to water allocation compacts
by formal act. See, e.g., Canadian River Compact, ch. 135, 64 Stat. 93 (1952); Kansas-
Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, Pub. L. No. 92-308, 86 Stat. 193 (1972); Snake River
Compact, ch. 73, 64 Stat. 29 (1950).
171. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991) (plurality opinion) and cases cited therein.
172. Id. (private cause of action implied under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (2000)); Reed v. Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989) (express cause of
action under §§ 101(a)(2) and 102 of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 412 (2000)); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (express cause of action under § 901(a) of Title IX of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c)
(2000)).
173. County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)
(federal common law cause of action to recover damages from wrongful possession of
tribal land).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...."
175. Contrary to the literal language of this clause, not all agreements between states
require congressional consent. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985). Interstate water allocation compacts do require consent,
though. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 559 (1983); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 105 (1938).
176. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1898); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347
(1994); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981).
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recognized that congressional consent transforms a water allocation
compact into a law of the United States.1 To the extent that
transformation occurs, a compact enforcement suit is based on a
congressionally created law of the United States.
Alternatively, the suit might be regarded as based on federal
common law. The Court has said that although a compact "approved by
Congress becomes a law of the United States,...a Compact is after all, a
contract. " 78 Thus, in Texas v. New Mexico, the Court treated the Pecos
River Compact as a contract in deciding the remedial issue of whether
retrospective relief was available for breach. Analogously, the Court
might treat a compact as a contract in deciding the remedial issue of
whether retrospective relief is available for the whole period of long-
continued breach or is limited by a borrowed statute of limitations. If the
Court opts for contract treatment regarding this remedial issue, the
common law governing it would have to be federal rather than state
because the equal footing of states in litigation prevents either state from
applying its common law to the other state. 17 That is why the Court
relied on federal common law in Kansas v. Colorado'80 to decide the
remedial issue of Kansas's right to prejudgment interest for Colorado's
breach of the Arkansas River Compact. 81
2. Likely Congressional Intent
Congressional intent has always been the basis for federal court
borrowing practice, but the source and nature of the intent have evolved.
Originally, the federal courts interpreted the Rules of Decision Act of
1789 to require borrowing of a statute of limitations from state law when
Congress had not provided a statute of limitations for a federal cause of
action.'82 After decades of borrowing on this basis, the Court came to
doubt that interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.8 But the Court
did not end borrowing. Instead, it characterized borrowing as merely the
177. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 564 (quoting Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438).
178. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
179. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
180. 533 U.S. 1 (2001).
181. See id. at 13-14 (relying principally on Board of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), and Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924), the former of which
was quite explicit that federal common law governed). For a more detailed discussion of
the Court's use of federal common law, see Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts, supra
note 13, at 164-66.
182. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983). Section 34 of
the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (1948), codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (2000), requires federal courts to apply "the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide."
183. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13.
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"interstitial fashioning of remedial details," and it reasoned that "[gliven
our longstanding practice of borrowing state law, and the congressional
awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that Congress
intends by its silence that we borrow state law."1"
The Court's most illuminating discussion of this general
assumption about congressional silence came in DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.'8 There, the Court noted that when
Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations for a federal cause of
action, there usually is no legislative history showing Congress even
considered the limitations issue.'8 The Court then said,
In such cases, the general preference for borrowing state
limitations periods could more aptly be called a sort of
fallback rule of thumb than a matter of ascertaining
legislative intent; it rests on the assumption that, absent
some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely
intend that the courts follow their previous practice of
borrowing state provisions.
8 7
This statement dispels any pretense of requiring evidence in legislative
history about what Congress intended regarding a limitations period for
the cause of action. The lack of such evidence is no problem because a
fallback rule of thumb fills the void: Congress would likely intend by its
silence that the courts borrow a state limitations period unless it would
have a sound reason to prefer otherwise.
DelCostello also illustrates operation of the "sound reason"
exception to the general practice of borrowing a state statute of
limitations. The Court borrowed a federal rather than state statute of
limitations in DelCostello because it "better reflected the balance that
Congress would have preferred between the substantive policies under
the federal claim and the policies of repose."8 In other words, a sound
reason existed to borrow the federal limitations period, so Congress
likely would have preferred that.
While the "sound reason" exception to state-law borrowing led
the Court to borrow a federal limitations period in DelCostello, the
exception has also led the Court to decline to borrow any statute of
limitations, state or federal, on "rare occasions." "9 These occasions
184. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987).
185. 462 U.S. at 169.
186. Id. at 160 n.12.
187. Id.
188. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985) (describing DelCostello).
189. Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356 n.3
(1991).
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apparently total two. On both occasions, evidence existed showing that
Congress likely intended no statute of limitations should be borrowed.
The first occasion was Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission." The suit arose under an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorized the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to sue employers in
federal court for sexually discriminatory practices against their
employees. The amendment provided no limitations period for such
suits. An employer argued for borrowing a state limitations period. In
rejecting this argument, the Court noted that during congressional
debates on the amendment, "many Members of both Houses
demonstrated an acute awareness of the enormous backlog of cases
before the EEOC." 19' And yet, in passing the amendment, "Congress
substantially increased the workload of the EEOC" in various ways,
including the authority to bring civil actions in federal court. 92 The Court
decided it would not "be reasonable to suppose that a Congress aware of
the severe time problems already facing the EEOC would grant that
agency substantial additional enforcement responsibilities and at the
same time consign its federal lawsuits to the vagaries of diverse state
limitations statutes, some as short as one year." 93
Occidental Life predated DelCostello, where the Court for the first
time borrowed a federal statute of limitations, so there might be some
question about how that new borrowing possibility would affect
Occidental Life. In any event, the evidence in Occidental Life from which
the Court inferred Congress would likely oppose borrowing a state
limitations statute has no counterpart regarding water allocation
compacts.9 Unlike the Occidental Life situation, states were attracted to
allocation by compact because they thought compacting would decrease,
not increase, the likelihood of litigation over their shares of interstate
streams.'9
190. 432 U.S. 355, 375-76 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that this was
the first case in which a federal cause of action not expressly subject to a federal limitations
period was held not to be subject to any limitations period at all).
191. Id. at 369.
192. Id. at 370.
193. Id. at 370-71.
194. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 158 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating, "Until DelCostello, we never responded to legislative silence
by applying a limitations period drawn from a different federal statute").
195. A study of congressional debates preceding consent to the various water compacts
surely would fail to turn up a single instance in which members of Congress expressed
concern about an enormous backlog of work in the signatory states' water agencies that
would be worsened by compact enforcement, and yet Congress approved the compact.
196. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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The second rare occasion was County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation,197 a federal common law action brought by three Indian tribes in
New York seeking damages for unlawful possession of their lands
during the preceding two years. The plaintiffs' ancestors conveyed the
land 175 years earlier, but the plaintiffs alleged the conveyance was
invalid for failure to comply with an Indian Nonintercourse Act.198 No
federal statute of limitations governed such suits.'9 The Court decided
that borrowing a New York limitations period would violate
congressional Indian policy as manifested by numerous statutes and
their legislative history) °
Interstate water allocation compacts present an entirely different
situation than Oneida. No federal trust responsibilities to the states are
involved. Nor is there any mosaic of statutes and legislative history
evidencing a general congressional policy against borrowing a
limitations period for interstate water compact suits. There is just
congressional silence.
Of course, one can speculate about the silence. But rather than
do that, it is more important to note the inutility of speculation. The
Court did not rely on mere speculation in Occidental Life and Oneida
when it rejected the general preference for borrowing state limitations
periods and concluded that Congress would likely intend no statute of
limitations should apply. In Occidental Life, legislative debates evidenced
congressional concern about the backlog of cases before the EEOC that
indicated Congress would not have wanted the Court to borrow a state
limitations period. In Oneida, evidence of general Indian policy existed
indicating Congress likely did not want the Court to borrow any
limitations period.
197. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
198. Id. at 229.
199. Id. at 240.
200. Id. at 241. Specifically, the Court noted that when Congress gave New York state
courts jurisdiction over civil actions involving Indian lands, it provided that the New York
statute of limitations would not apply to Indian land claims predating 1952. Id. Later, in
1966, Congress enacted a special limitations period for suits by the United States on behalf
of Indians but expressly excluded actions regarding title to or possession of property. Id. at
241-42. Still later, Congress extended the limitations period several times for pre-1966
claims. Id. at 242. The Court concluded that the legislative history of the 1966 act and its
amendments revealed that Congress always regarded the statutory time bar as limited to
suits by the United States and inapplicable to suits by tribes or individual Indians. Id.
Finally, in 1982, Congress amended the statute of limitations to cover certain contract and
tort claims by tribes and individual Indians but included various protective measures. Id. at
242-43. Overall, said the Court, the limitations history was "replete with evidence of
Congress' concern that the United States had failed to live up to its responsibilities as
trustee for the Indians." Id. at 244. Therefore, the Court inferred that borrowing of a state
statute of limitations likely would violate Congress's intent.
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The DelCostello analytical framework, as illuminated by
Occidental Life and Oneida, has three elements:
1. The Court assumes congressional awareness of the
longstanding federal court practice of borrowing a state
statute of limitations when Congress has not provided one
for a federal cause of action.
2. When Congress is silent about a limitations period for a
particular federal cause of action, the Court infers from the
silence that Congress accepts federal court borrowing
practice for that cause of action.
3. But the Court will not infer congressional acceptance of
the borrowing practice for a particular cause of action if
affirmative evidence exists of some sound reason for
Congress to intend otherwise.
The inference of congressional acceptance in element 2 does not
require specific supporting evidence in legislative history. Instead, it
arises from the combination of congressional awareness of borrowing
practice and congressional silence about a limitations period for the
cause of action in question. These combined factors provide sufficient
support for the inference to be drawn unless there is evidence of some
sound reason for Congress to intend otherwise. But the inference is
sufficiently well grounded that evidence, not merely speculation, is
required to negate it. For this reason, more than mere speculation should
be required in water compact enforcement suits for the Court to
conclude that Congress would likely intend no limitations period should
be borrowed.
At least that is true if compact suits between states fit within the
DelCostello framework. A critic can point out that it is not immediately
apparent they do. According to DelCostello, the Court infers from
congressional silence about a particular cause of action that "Congress
would likely intend that the courts follow their previous practice of
borrowing state provisions. " 201 The cases that created congressional
awareness of federal court borrowing practice include no suits between
states. Because no established borrowing practice exists for suits between
states, the critic could object that congressional silence about a
limitations period does not imply Congress would likely want the Court
to borrow a statute of limitations in compact enforcement suits.
This is a serious objection, but it is not necessarily insur-
mountable. Although DelCostello did link borrowing to congressional
201. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.12 (1983) (emphasis
added).
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awareness of longstanding judicial borrowing practice, there is more to
DelCostello than that. The fallback borrowing rule "assum[es] that, absent
some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that
courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state provisions. " M
The "sound reason" exception overcomes the general assumption (or
inference) about what Congress would likely intend. Thus, sound reason
is the ultimate guide to what Congress would likely intend.
Arguably, sound reason supports borrowing the most analogous
limitations period in water compact enforcement cases despite the lack of
a longstanding judicial practice of doing so. The argument is built on the
Court's view, which goes back nearly two centuries to Adams v. Woods,2
that "[a] federal cause of action brought at any distance of time would be
utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws."' The Court has repeated
this axiom over the years, sometimes elaborating as follows: "Just
determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of
time, the memories of witness have faded or evidence is lost. In
compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that
their sins may be forgotten."206
The "utter repugnance" case of greatest present interest is
Campbell v. City of Haverhill,2 where the Court held that Congress
intended judicial borrowing of a state limitations statute in an
infringement case under federal patent law. One reason the Court gave
for the result was that unless a state limitations period were borrowed,
we have the anomaly of a distinct class of actions subject to
no limitation whatever,-a class of privileged plaintiffs
who, in this particular, are outside the pale of the law, and
subject to no limitation of time in which they may institute
their actions....This cannot have been within the contem-
plation of the legislative power. As was said by Chief
Justice Marshall in Adams v. Woods... of a similar statute:
"This would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our
laws....,208
202. Id.
203. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
204. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)
(quoting from but slightly reordering the Adams statement to read as it does in the text);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (doing the same with Adams as Agency Holding
Corp.).
205. See, e.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1914); Campbell v. City of
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895).
206. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271.
207. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
208. Id. at 616-17.
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The Court treated the "utter repugnance" axiom as shaping what
Congress contemplated.
Campbell supplements the DelCostello framework for borrowing.
In Campbell, the Court assumed that Congress was aware of the "utter
repugnance" axiom. In effect, the Court inferred that Congress, being
guided by sound reason, accepted the axiom by silence and would likely
intend the federal courts to borrow a statute of limitations. Campbell
shows that congressional awareness and acceptance of longstanding
judicial borrowing practice is not the only basis for concluding Congress
would likely intend by its silence for the Court to borrow a statute of
limitations. Another basis is congressional awareness and acceptance of
the venerable judicial "utter repugnance" axiom.
Under the DelCostello framework, as supplemented by Campbell,
Congress is guided ultimately by sound reason, is aware of the "utter
repugnance" axiom, and likely accepts it when silent about a limitations
period for a federal cause of action. If sound reason indicates nullum
tempus is ill fitted for suits between states (as argued in section III), the
Court should infer that had Congress considered the limitations issue, it
would likely have intended the Court to borrow the most analogous
statute of limitations in water allocation compact enforcement suits.
B. The Most Analogous Statute of Limitations to Borrow
Although the Court borrowed a federal statute of limitations in
DelCostello, it stressed that "resort to state law remains the norm for
borrowing." 2°9 The Court later called state limitations law the lender of
first resort and federal limitations law the secondary lender. 210 Therefore,
in deciding which statute to borrow, the Court first identifies the "most
closely analogous" state statute of limitations.2 ' Then it inquires whether
borrowing this statute "would frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies or be at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law."21 2 If so, the Court seeks a federal
statute of limitations that better reflects what Congress would likely
have preferred.2 3 Consistent with this approach, the following discussion
of borrowing in water compact enforcement suits begins by considering
state limitations statutes.
209. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983).
210. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1995).
211. Id. at 34 (quoting Reed v. Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323 (1989), in turn quoting
DelCostello, 426 U.S. at 158).
212. N. Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
213. See id.; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985).
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1. State Limitations Law
Finding the most closely analogous state statute of limitations
for a federal cause of action requires characterizing the cause of action."'
The proper characterization of a suit for breach of a water allocation
compact should be straightforward. As noted earlier, the Court has said
that although congressional consent to a compact transforms it into a law
of the United States, "a compact is, after all, a contract."215 Thus, the most
closely analogous statute of limitations in state law should be the one for
written contracts.
A complication arises, however, because each state in a compact
enforcement suit will have its own statute of limitations for written
contracts. If their statutes specify the same period for bringing suit,
would Congress likely intend the Court to borrow both of them (or, what
amounts to the same thing, either of them)? If their statutes specify
different periods, would Congress likely intend the Court to borrow the
longer one? The shorter one? The defendant state's? The plaintiff state's?
Or none of the above because a federal statute of limitations provides a
better fit?
DelCostello suggests an approach to answering these questions.
There, the Court assumed that absent sound reason to do otherwise,
Congress would likely intend it to follow its previous borrowing
practice.16 By analogy, the Court might assume that absent sound reason
to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend it to follow the same
general precepts it has used in other cases between states so far as they
bear on issues in compact enforcement suits. Congress presumably is
aware of these other cases and their precepts, just as it is presumed to be
aware of the cases that established the borrowing practice. The Court
could infer that when Congress consents to a water allocation compact
without considering a limitations period, Congress would likely intend
by its silence for the Court to follow those general precepts in its
interstitial fashioning of remedial details for breach of compact.
The important cases between states under this approach to
inferring likely congressional intent are those dealing with the equitable
apportionment of interstate rivers. In the first case,217 decided in 1907, the
Court ruled that federal interstate common law necessarily governs
because "[olne cardinal rule underlying all the relations of the States to
214. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. Generally, characterization of a federal cause of action is
itself a matter of federal law. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Maley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483
U.S. 143, 147 (1987); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 270-71.
215. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (quoting Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
216. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
217. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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each other, is that of equality of right .... [and thus a State] can impose its
own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own
view to none.".. In the second case,219 decided in 1922, the two litigating
states both used the appropriation doctrine for purposes of internal
water allocation. Applying federal interstate common law, the Court
made an apportionment based on the priority-in-time rule of the
appropriation doctrine. It reasoned that "[b]oth States pronounce the
rule just and reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that
region [so] its application to such a controversy as is here presented
cannot be other than eminently just and equitable."20
In the next apportionment case, decided in 1931, the two
litigating states both applied the riparian doctrine internally.2 2 One
might have expected the Court to base its interstate apportionment on
riparian principles, but it did not do so. It said that internal state law
should "be taken into account" but does not "have controlling weight."m
The same year, in another case between riparian states, the Court again
declined to use riparian principles to apportion an interstate river
because "the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment
without quibbling over formulas." m
Since then, the Court has continued to adhere to the view that it
will not simply adopt, as federal interstate common law, the water law
principles that competing states use for internal allocation even when the
states follow identical principles.24 Instead, the Court seeks to make a
"delicate adjustment of interests"m between the states that considers
numerous factors.'
Based on these apportionment cases, and presumed con-
gressional awareness of them, the consent of Congress to water compacts
formed between 1922 and 1931 might be interpreted as indicating
Congress would likely intend for the Court to borrow state limitations
periods when the litigating states have identical periods for written
contracts. But most water allocation compacts postdate 1931.=' With
these compacts, and with compacts of any vintage between states not
having identical statutes of limitations, it is doubtful that Congress
218. Id. at 97.
219. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
220. Id. at 470.
221. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
222. Id. at 670.
223. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,343 (1931).
224. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (two appropriation doctrine
states); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (three appropriation doctrine states).
225. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618.
226. For discussion of the various factors the Court has considered, see generally
Apportionment Suits, supra note 3, at § 45.06.
227. See Water Compacts, supra note 1, § 46.01, Table of Water Apportionment Compacts.
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would likely intend the Court to borrow either state's statute of
limitations.
2. Federal Limitations Law
Two federal statutes of limitations are candidates for borrowing.
The first one, section 2415(a) of title 28, is a six-year statute of limitations
for "every action for money damages brought by the United
States.. .which is founded upon any contract."28 This statute is a good fit
so far as compacts are contracts between states.29 The statute's reference
to "money damages" is problematic, however, because a state suing for
breach of a water allocation compact might seek either money damages
or payment in water. In Texas v. New Mexico, the Court characterized
payment in water as having "all the earmarks of specific performance, an
equitable remedy."2
The issue of whether the statutory phrase "money damages"
should be read broadly to include an action brought by the United States
for the equitable remedy of specific performance has been raised but not
decided.31 Even if the phrase were not read to include specific
performance when the United States is the plaintiff and the issue is
whether section 2415(a) applies of its own force, a literal approach to
statutory interpretation seems out of place when a state is the plaintiff
and the issue is whether to borrow the statute as the most apt analogy.
The borrowing context is an especially strong one for allowing the policy
concerns behind statutory language to influence its interpretation. 2
The Senate Report on section 2415 reveals the policy concerns
behind the "money damages" language:
Suits for injunction and other extraordinary relief are not
covered by this bill .... [An injunction is sought when
prompt action is essential to prevent irreparable harm, or is
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (2000).
229. See supra notes 178-215 and accompanying text. Cf. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 1, 92 (1823) (a Contract Clause case in which the court said, "If we attend to the
definition of a contract, which is the agreement of two or more parties, to do, or not to do,
certain acts, it must be obvious, that [a compact between states] is a contract. In fact, the
terms compact and contract are synonymous...").
230. 482 U.S. 124, 131 (1987).
231. See United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634, 637 n.1 (1981) (finding it unnecessary to
reach that question).
232. Cf. Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence:
Using Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual Statute of Limitations, 107
YALE L.J. 393, 418 (1997) (arguing that the federal court borrowing of a limitations period
when Congress has not provided one for a federal cause of action is an "area of more or
less candid judicial lawmaking" in which "congressional texts play a less significant
interpretive role").
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required to forestall a significant change in position. The
Government must decide to seek an injunction at once or
not at all. It also must be recognized that the Government
brings the injunction in order to protect and defend
Government activities and programs. It simply is not
sensible to diminish the power to the Government to utilize
an injunction to accomplish these ends.23
This paragraph focuses on prospective relief-"prevent," "forestall," and
"protect and defend." Ordinarily, injunctions are preventive or
protective and do not redress past wrongs.' The paragraph suggests
that the "money damages" limitation in section 2415(a) reflects a
distinction between retrospective relief (money damages) and
prospective relief (injunctions). The last sentence of the paragraph adds a
concern about ensuring that the government will be able to obtain
injunctions protecting its activities and programs even if it delays longer
than six years to seek them.
In a suit for breach of a water allocation compact, money
damages and payment in water are both forms of retrospective
compensatory relief. Borrowing section 2415(a) to limit both forms of
retrospective compensatory relief would not run afoul of the
retrospective/prospective dichotomy in the Senate Report. Borrowing
would not bar the plaintiff state from prospective injunctive relief
despite the defendant state's long-continued breach. Section 2415(c)
states that "[niothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for
bringing an action to establish the title to, or right to possession of, real
or personal property."2' This suggests that section 2415(a) should not
operate, when borrowed in a water compact case, to enable the
defendant state to acquire prescriptive title, by adverse use, to more
water than the compact specifies.2 If the defendant state cannot enlarge
its allocation by adverse use, then an injunction ordering future
233. S. REP. No. 89-1328 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2509.
234. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 2 (2000): "Injunctive relief is designed to meet a real
threat of a future wrong or a contemporary wrong of a nature likely to continue or recur.
Whether interlocutory or final, injunctive relief is ordinarily preventive or protective in
character and restrains actions that have not yet been taken. It is generally not intended to
redress, or punish for, past wrongs."
235. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c) (2000).
236. Section 2415(c) also should preclude borrowing the six-year limitations period in a
suit for breach of a boundary compact where the plaintiff state alleges the defendant state
is exercising sovereignty (analogous to title or possession in the statute) beyond the
compact line. Thus, borrowing the six-year statute of limitations in a suit for breach of a
water allocation compact would not conflict with the Court's view that boundary compact
suits are to be decided by applying the doctrine of acquiescence rather than a statute of
limitations. See Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 388 (1991).
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compliance with the compact would be available despite the plaintiff
state's delay in suing.
The other federal candidate for borrowing is the residual four-
year statute of limitations noted earlier."7 Codified as section 1658(a) of
title 28, it applies to "any civil action" not having a specific limitations
statute if the action "aris[es] under an act of Congress enacted after the
date of the enactment of this section [December 1, 1990]." The statute
applies by its terms to civil actions arising under acts of Congress
enacted after December 1, 1990.
But can section 1658(a) be borrowed for federal causes of action
not within its terms?m Apparently, no federal court has yet addressed
that question. Section 1658(a) should be a viable candidate for borrowing
unless the December 1, 1990 date implies that Congress would not want
it borrowed for causes of action arising under earlier acts of Congress or
under federal common law. Recently, Abner J. Mikva and James E.
Pfander advanced an interest group analysis to argue that no such
implication exists.2 They say that if a cut-off date had not been included
in the legislative bill that became section 1658(a), the bill probably would
have been opposed by well-organized business groups and institutions
who, as potential defendants, generally prefer the less clearly defined
judicial borrowing process because it is more burdensome and
discouraging to plaintiffs.2 4° In their view, the December 1, 1990 date was
included in the bill only to avoid opposition from these groups24 and
does not indicate Congress intended to make the residual four-year
242statute off limits to federal courts in their borrowing practice.
237. Supra note 167 and accompanying text.
238. For civil actions not within the terms of section 1658(a), the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts to date have continued to borrow the most analogous statute of
limitations. See N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995) (borrowing state statute of
limitations for federal cause of action under Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991) (borrowing federal statute of limitations for private federal cause of action under
section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d
220 (3d Cir. 2000) (borrowing state statute of limitations for federal cause of action under
Civil Rights Act of 1870 as amended); Providence Sch. Dep't v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997) (borrowing state statute of limitations for federal cause of action under Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act); Barajas v. Bermudez, 43 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 1994)
(borrowing state statute of limitations for federal cause of action under Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act).
239. Mikva & Pfander, supra note 232, at 400-08.
240. Id. at 404.
241. Id. at 402-05.
242. See id. at 408. Mikva and Pfander go further and criticize current borrowing
practice insofar as it makes state limitations law the falback preference when Congress has
not addressed the limitations issue. Id. at 409-14. They urge the Supreme Court to replace
the current preference with a preference for borrowing a federal statute of limitations. Id. at
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If sections 1658(a) and 2415(a) are both available for borrowing,
section 2415(a) appears to be the stronger candidate for two reasons.
First, it is designed for contract actions, and as the Court has said, a
compact is, after all, a contract.243 Second, the Court has been disinclined
to infer that Congress would likely intend it to borrow residual statutes
of limitations from state law,2" and this disinclination might carry over to
a residual federal statute of limitations.
Section 1658(a) cannot be ruled out as a possibility, however. In
passing section 1658(a), Congress obviously concluded that four years
was an appropriate catchall period for federal causes of action under
post-December 1, 1990 acts of Congress. The considerations that led
Congress to this conclusion arguably make it likely Congress would
conclude four years is also an appropriate catchall period for federal
courts to borrow for other federal causes of action that lack a specific
statute of limitations.245
C. Borrowing to Limit Equitable Relief
The Supreme Court's view that borrowing is based on likely
congressional intent has led it to impose a constraint on borrowing
rooted in historic equity jurisprudence. Courts of equity traditionally
have refused to apply any statute of limitations not applicable by its
terms in equity if equitable jurisdiction is exclusive. 2" They have applied
such a statute only if law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction24 7 and
have done so then because otherwise the statute's purpose could be
evaded by the plaintiff's choice of forum.2' Supreme Court borrowing
practice for federal causes of action mirrors this approach. 249 Although
the Court will borrow a statute of limitations not applicable by its terms
in equity if law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction,27° it will not
396, 414-21. More particularly, they advocate using the residual four-year limit of section
1658(a) as the fallback preference. Id. at 396, 416.
243. Supra notes 178 and 215 and accompanying text.
244. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1987); Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985).
245. It is true regarding civil actions arising under post-December 1, 1990 enactments,
that Congress could have chosen when enacting the legislation to include a specific statute
of limitations if it did not like the four-year period. But for civil actions arising under
earlier enactments or federal common law, Congress could have enacted a specific statute
of limitations any time it chose.
246. 1 H.G. WOOD, LiMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 59 (4th DeWitt C. Moore ed. 1916).
247. Id. § 58.
248. Id. at 267.
249. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (action under federal banking
legislation); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940) (action under Federal Farm Loan Act).
250. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. at 463-64.
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borrow if "the sole remedy is in equity."251 The Court does not borrow
when equity has exclusive jurisdiction, because Congress would "hardly
expect [it] to break with historic principles of equity in the enforcement
of federally-created equitable rights." 2
This constraint on borrowing practice requires inquiry into
whether a suit between states for breach of a water allocation compact
would lie concurrently in law and equity or solely in equity. To focus the
inquiry with an example that presents the strongest case for finding sole
equitable jurisdiction, suppose a state suing for breach of a water
compact requests retrospective relief in water, not money, and injunctive
relief ordering future performance. The Court has said that retrospective
relief might be in "water or money,"23 and it has characterized payment
in water as having "all the earmarks of specific performance, an
equitable remedy."2 Would the hypothetical suit for equitable relief be
in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity, or would it be concurrent with law
because the plaintiff could have elected to seek only money damages?
In Cope v. Anderson,25 the Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction
was concurrent when the receiver of an insolvent national bank sued the
bank's Ohio and Pennsylvania shareholders in equity to enforce
assessment liaoility imposed by federal banking legislation.2 The suits
were in separate federal district courts, one in each state. No federal
statute of limitations applied, so the issue arose of whether the federal
courts should borrow the states' statutes of limitations. The Supreme
Court ruled they should because equity jurisdiction was not exclusive
but concurrent: "it is only the scope of the relief sought and the
multitude of parties sued which gives equity concurrent jurisdiction to
enforce the legal obligation here asserted.",27 The Seventh Circuit has
summarized Cope and its lower federal court progeny in Nemkov v.
O'Hare Chicago Corp." as follows: "Equitable jurisdiction is concurrent
even though plaintiff chooses to forego damages and seek only equitable
relief" 9 and even though the remedy at law "would have been
impractical as well as costly., 26° Under this approach, the plaintiff state in
251. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); accord, Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S.
at 289-90.
252. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395.
253. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (1987).
254. Id. at 131.
255. 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
256. Id. at 463.
257. Id. at 463-64.
258. 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979).
259. Id. at 355. See also Winne v. Queens Land & Title Co., 149 N.Y.S. 664, 665 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1914) (a suit in equity for specific performance of a contract to convey land is
concurrent with a suit at law for damages and thus is barred by the statute of limitations).
260. Nemkov, 592 F.2d at 355.
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the compact example could not avoid the borrowing of a statute of
limitations by seeking only equitable relief because it could have sued
instead for legal relief.
The plaintiff state might object that even if it could have sought
retrospective relief in money damages, rather than water, it still needs
equitable relief ordering future compliance to avoid irreparable harm-a
remedy not available at law. Nemkov provides a short answer to the
objection. The Nemkov plaintiffs opposed borrowing on the ground that
they sought only equitable relief not obtainable at law. The court
responded, "The inquiry is not whether a plaintiff could obtain the same
relief at law; rather, it is whether the statute relied on [for the cause of
action] requires the plaintiff to seek relief only in equity." 261 In a suit for
breach of a water allocation compact, nothing would require the plaintiff
to seek relief only in equity.
In addition to the short answer based on Nemkov, the defendant
state could respond to the plaintiff state's objection as follows: Even if
prospective relief lies solely within the injunctive power of equity,
prospective and retrospective relief are separate matters. The defendant
is not asserting the statute of limitations (plus the passage of time) to
prescriptively modify its compact delivery obligation for the future.262
Rather, it is asserting the statute of limitations only to limit the period of
retrospective relief, and retrospective relief lies in the concurrent
jurisdiction of law and equity because the plaintiff state had the option of
seeking either damages or specific performance. Jurisdiction is
concurrent in that situation-just as it is concurrent in private suits to
enforce contracts to convey land because the plaintiffs could seek either
damages or specific performance.2"
A final potential issue about borrowing a statute of limitations in
water compact litigation should be addressed. In Ohio v. Kentucky, 2M the
Court said that its original jurisdiction cases "are basically equitable in
nature."265 Does this mean suits between states are so fundamentally
equitable that, regardless of whether damages are or might be sought,
they ought to come within the rule against borrowing when the sole
remedy is in equity?
261. Id. at 354.
262. Cf. supra the text accompanying notes 235-236.
263. E.g., Spates v. Spates, 296 A.2d 581, 586 (Md. 1972); Winne, 149 N.Y.S. 664;
Collard's Adm'r v. Tuttle, 4 Vt. 491, 492, 1832 WL 2056 (1832); Smith v. Carney, 11 Ky. (1
Litt.) 295, 1822 WL 1029; WOOD, supra note 246, § 58 at 271-72; contra Wright v. Leclaire, 3
Iowa 221, 1856 WL 187.
264. 410 U.S. 641 (1973).
265. Id. at 648.
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Ohio v. Kentucky was an interstate boundary dispute.26 Ohio
sought a declaration of the true boundary2 6 7 based on its interpretation of
pre-Revolutionary War documents.2 8 Various cases decided by both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court were inconsistent with
Ohio's legal theory, but they did not bar Ohio by res judicata because it
was not a party to the cases.269 The Court held Ohio was barred, however,
by its long acquiescence in the boundary as located by those cases. 27 The
Court explained that "proceedings under this Court's original
jurisdiction are basically equitable in nature, and a claim not technically
precluded [by res judicata] nonetheless may be foreclosed by
acquiescence." 27 ' Thus, the Court made its "basically equitable"
statement for the purpose of applying the doctrine of acquiescence to bar
a stale claim.
Later, the Court quoted the "basically equitable" remark in a suit
between states to interpret a much earlier equitable apportionment
decree for an interstate river.2n As in Ohio v. Kentucky, the Court relied on
the "basically equitable" remark for the purpose of using acquiescence to
dispose of a stale claim.
In sum, the basically equitable nature of a suit between states in
the Court's original jurisdiction has hardly meant that untimely claims
are favored. It would be a considerable extension in function of the
"basically equitable" remark, almost a reversal in function, to use it to
preclude borrowing a statute of limitations in water compact litigation to
deal with a stale claim. The remark is too undeveloped and uncertain in
function to create any expectation in Congress that water compact
enforcement suits are so fundamentally equitable, regardless of the relief
sought, that they come within the historic equity rule against applying a
statute of limitations when equity has exclusive jurisdiction.
But even if water compact enforcement suits were deemed solely
equitable at some fundamental level,2n this still should not preclude
266. Id. at 642-43 (Ohio claimed the boundary was the middle of the Ohio River, while
Kentucky maintained it was the northerly side of the river).
267. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 642.
268. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at
10, 17-20, Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641 (1973) (No. 27, Orig.).
269. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 645-47.
270. Id. at 648-51.
271. Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
272. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584,595 (1993).
273. In Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001), Kansas sought a decree ordering Colorado
to deliver water in accordance with the Arkansas River Compact, supra note 65, plus
damages for breach, supra note 66. Although the Court accepted the damages
characterization of the retrospective relief without comment, see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S.
at 6-9, it is possible to view the claim differently. Some courts say that when a land sale
contract purchaser is granted specific performance plus money to compensate for the
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borrowing. The historic equity rule is that a statute of limitations not
applicable by its terms in equity does not control relief if equity has sole
jurisdiction.2 74 There is state court authority that a statute of limitations
for an action "upon any contract... obligation" applies in equity because
the statute "is directed to the subject matter and not to the form of the
action, or the forum in which it is prosecuted." 2 Under this reasoning,
the Court could borrow section 2415(a), which applies to an action "upon
any contract," even if a suit to enforce a water compact were solely
equitable.
Also, residual statutes of limitations necessarily use broad
language because they are intended to fill gaps left by specific statutes of
limitations. State courts have held that residual statutes of limitations
apply in equity by their terms.276 In particular, it has been held that a
statute of limitations for "civil actions" embraces equitable as well as
legal actions. Under this reasoning, the Court could borrow section
1658(a), which applies to "any civil action," in a compact enforcement
suit even if the suit were solely equitable.
V. CONCLUSION
Modem Supreme Court cases on long-continued breach of
interstate water allocation compacts have created a risk of huge liability
for states that breach their water delivery obligations. This is so even if
the state's breach resulted from its good faith misinterpretation of
compact language or misunderstanding of hydrologic conditions. To rein
in the liability, this article has argued that the nullum tempus principle
should not apply in water compact enforcement suits between states
because its public-benefit rationale fails in that situation and because its
application is inconsistent with the constitutional plan of equal footing
for litigating states.
With nullum tempus out of the way, the defense of laches
becomes available and, depending on the facts, may bar or reduce a
defendant state's liability for breach. Also, the possibility arises of the
Court borrowing a statute of limitations to further limit stale claims.
Borrowing a statute of limitations admittedly is more problematic than
delay, the money is not really damages for breach but is equitable compensation in the
nature of an accounting-because in ordering specific performance, the court is confirming
the contract and expunging the breach. 71 AM. JuR.2D, Specific Performance § 235 (2001).
274. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
275. Lord v. Morris & Goodman, 18 Cal. 482, at 482,486-87 (1861).
276. E.g., Piller v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 52 Cal. 42, 44 (1877); McCord v. Nabours, 109
S.W. 913, 917-18 (Tex. 1908); American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757,
760 (Ut. 1992).
277. White v. Sheldon, 4 Nev. 280, 1868 WL 1977 at *4 (1868).
Spring 2003]
418 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 43
applying laches-more problematic but not without arguable
justification. Modern federal court borrowing practice is based on what
Congress would likely intend as a matter of sound reason. With nullum
tempus not a factor in water compact suits, congressional awareness and
acceptance of the Court's longstanding view about the benefits of
limitations periods arguably would provide sound reason for Congress
to intend that the Court apply a borrowed statute of limitations. The
most closely analogous statute probably would be a federal statute of
limitations, either the one for contract actions by the United States for
money damages or the residual one for civil actions arising under acts of
Congress postdating it.
